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Summary 
1. French commercial banks are proposing a swap 
of €85.5 billion in Greek government bonds 
maturing between 2011 and 2014 into a 
combination of new long-term Greek bonds with 
principal guarantee and cash payments. If this 
initiative were implemented under the proposed 
parameters, private creditors would only suffer a 
minimal haircut and official lenders would be 
provided with cash-flow relief of around €20 
billion over the next three years, but the solvency 
of the Hellenic Republic would worsen 
significantly.  
Details of the French proposal 
2. Earlier this week, representatives from 
European commercial banks and insurance 
companies met with policy-makers in Rome, at 
the Italian Treasury. In this meeting, the 
Fédération Bancaire Française made a proposal 
for a restructuring of Greek government debt. 
The original text of this “long-term investor 
initiative for Greece” has been published on the 
internet 1 and thus constitutes public information 
(reproduced in an annex to this note).  
                                                     
1 Fédération Bancaire Française, “Long-term investor 
initiative for Greece”, 24 June 2011 
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/58960145/Crise-grecque-
la-proposition-de-la-FBF). 
3. French banks are proposing that holders of 
Greek government bonds coming due between 
July 2011 and June 2014 should receive: 
• 70% in new 30-year Greek government bonds 
with a 5.5% coupon plus a GDP-linked 
surcharge of up to 2.5%, and a full principal 
guarantee in the form of AAA-rated zero-
coupon bonds.  
• 30% in cash. 
Evaluation from the perspective of 
private creditors 
4. Under the French proposal, Greece would be 
obliged to purchase 30-year zero-coupon bonds 
from the EFSF or another AAA-rated issuer to 
fully guarantee the principal repayment of new 
30-year Greek government bonds. This collateral 
would be placed with the ECB as trustee, and 
released to bondholders in case of Greece’s 
default on its new government bonds. The new 
Greek government bonds with principal 
guarantee thus constitute a combination of two 
financial instruments that need to be valued 
separately. For every €100 original face value in 
Greek government bonds, holders would receive: 
a) €70 face value in 30-year annuities with a 
5.5% coupon plus a GDP-linked surcharge of 
up to 2.5%. These annuity payments are 
subject to Greek default risk. 
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b) €70 face value in a 30-year risk-free zero-
coupon bond.  
c) €30 in cash. 
5. The present value (PVa) of the string of annuity 
payments (a) is defined as: 
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with C denoting the coupon rate, P the new 
principal as percentage of original face value, W 
payments from the GDP warrant, r the exit yield 
and n the maturity in years. Under the French 
proposal, C = 5.5%, P = 70% and n = 30. For the 
sake of simplicity, we assign a value of zero to W. 
We will show below that a restructuring under 
these lines will not contribute to restoring 
sovereign debt sustainability for Greece. 
Therefore, we assume an exit yield r of 12%. 
Under these assumptions, the economic value of 
the annuity payments (a) is €31 for every €100 in 
original face value. 
6. The second component of the package is 
designed to provide a guaranteed principal 
payment in 30 years. In order to achieve this, the 
Hellenic Republic would purchase zero-coupon 
bonds from the EFSF or another AAA-rated 
issuer. The present value of this zero-coupon 
bond (PVb) is given by  
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with rf denoting the interest rate of risk-free 
investments. If we take the 30 year zero-coupon 
rate that is derived by bootstrapping the euro 
swap curve as risk-free rate, then we can set 
rf = 3.78%. Under this assumption, PVb amounts 
to € 23 for every € 100 in original face value.  
7. Under an exit yield of 12%, the total value of 
the package is thus €31 + €23 + €30 = €84 for 
every €100 in original face value. The haircut for 
bondholders would be very small. If we assume 
an exit yield of 14.5%, which is the discount rate 
the market currently applies to three-year Greek 
government bonds, then we can assign an 
economic value of €79 for every €100 in original 
face value. On top of this, some value should be 
assigned to the GDP warrants which would be 
attached to the new securities. In any case, 
holders that have currently marked their holdings 
of three-year Greek government bonds to market 
would be able to record significant gains from 
current prices of around 60% of face value if they 
participated in the debt exchange.  
Evaluation from the perspective of 
official lenders 
8. Greece has been using multilateral loans to 
repay maturing market debt after losing market 
access in the spring of 2010. Since the inception of 
the current programme, €29 billion out of total 
disbursements of €53 billion in international loans 
have been paid out to holders of maturing 
medium- and long-term government bonds. 
Official lenders have now accepted that Greece 
won’t regain market access in the foreseeable 
future because private creditors view the country 
as insolvent. The IMF and the EU would have to 
provide Greece with additional loans of roughly 
€85.5 billion just to cover the remaining 
amortisation payments on medium-and long-
term debt between July 2011 and June 2014, if 
they want to avoid burden-sharing with the 
private sector (key numbers taken from Table 13 
in the Third Review of the IMF Programme2).  
9. If all private creditors were to participate in the 
swap proposed by French banks, the required 
refinancing of market debt would drop 
significantly in the next three years. For every 
€100 in bonds coming due the Greek government 
would only have to pay private creditors €30 in 
cash, and it would have to spend €23 to purchase 
zero-coupon bonds as collateral. These cash 
outlets would have to be funded by new loans of 
€53 from official lenders. The Greek government 
would also be assuming new market debt with a 
face value of €70 in the process.  
10. Full endorsement of the French proposal by 
private creditors would thus reduce multilateral 
lending to Greece by around €40 billion for the 
period of July 2011 to June 2014 (from €85.5 
billion to €45.3 billion). Assuming no 
participation by the ECB and a purely voluntary 
participation by private creditors would likely 
reduce this cash flow relief to €20 billion or so. 
                                                     
2 International Monetary Fund, “Greece: Third Review 
Under the Stand-By Arrangement”, IMF Country Report 
No. 11/68, March 2011 (http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1168.pdf). 
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Evaluation from the perspective of the 
Hellenic Republic 
11. Under IMF staff projections, Greece’s interest 
payments on public debt will amount to 8.6% of 
GDP in 2014. This assumes that new debt is 
contracted at Bunds + 300 basis points (see Table 
8 in the Third Programme Review). The costs of 
this magnitude are outside the range of the debt 
servicing expenditures that advanced economies 
have sustained over the past 15 years. As the 
figure below shows, there are only four out of 110 
countries rated by Moody’s that have faced 
public debt service in excess of 8.5% of GDP in 
the recent past. These countries have been able to 
alleviate their public debt service through debt 
restructurings (Jamaica and Lebanon) or through 
devaluation, inflation and rapid growth (Turkey 
and Iceland). In all four countries, most of the 
government debt has been held by domestic 
agents, sometimes even by state-owned banks. In 
the case of Greece, devaluation and inflation are 
impossible under the current monetary regime, 
rapid growth is quite unlikely given sky-high 
interest rates for the private sector, and financial 
repression is not an option either as most of the 
government debt is held by foreign investors. 
Because of this, private investors believe that 
Greece will have to resort to debt restructuring in 
order to bring down its public debt service costs 
to an affordable level. This raises the question 
whether the French proposal would contribute to 
meaningful debt service relief for the country. 
 
 
 
* Advanced economies exclude Hong Kong, Singapore and Greece. 
Sources: IMF, Moody’s, author’s calculations (110 countries, 15 years of data). 
 
12. It turns out that the French proposal would 
not allow for any debt service relief – to the 
contrary, it would significantly increase the 
interest burden of the Hellenic Republic. In order 
to demonstrate this outcome, we focus only on 
the stock of €85.5 billion in government bonds 
coming due between July 2010 and June 2014 
which is subject to the proposal.  
• The weighted-average coupon rate on this 
stock of debt is close to 4.3%. At present, the 
annual debt service amounts to:  
Medium-term market debt: €85.5 billion 
Annual debt service cost: €85.5 billion 
4.3% = € 3.7 billion 
• In the absence of burden sharing with the 
private sector, the Greek government would 
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slowly replace this stock of market debt with 
new loans from official lenders that currently 
carry an interest rate of 5.5%. In June 2014, the 
picture would look as follows: 
New market debt: €0 billion 
New multilateral debt: €85.5 billion 
Annual debt service cost: € 85.5 billion · 
5.5% = €4.7 billion 
• As explained in paragraph (9) above, full 
participation in the French proposal until June 
2014 would alter Greece’s debt profile in the 
following way: 
New bonds with principal guarantee: 
€ 85.5 billion · 70% = € 59.9 billion 
New loans from official creditors: 
€ 85.5 billion · 53% = € 45.3 billion 
Annual debt service cost: 
€ 105.2 billion · 5.5% = € 5.8 billion 
The form of ‘burden sharing’ proposed by the 
Fédération Bancaire Française would thus 
increase Greece’s gross public sector debt and the 
sovereign’s annual net interest payments by 23% 
compared to a solution with no private sector 
involvement at all. Greece would have to target a 
significantly higher primary surplus in order to 
sustain this additional debt in the future.  
13. It can be argued that the French proposal 
would actually not alter Greece’s stock of net 
public sector debt, as the government would 
acquire financial assets in the form of zero-
coupon bonds in the process. However, what 
counts for a distressed sovereign is not the 
theoretical concept of net debt but the actual 
interest payments that have to be financed 
through tax revenues, and these interest 
payments are a function of gross government 
debt. The cash outlets of the Greek government 
will not be offset by cash revenues from a 30-year 
zero-coupon bond, because zero-coupon bonds 
pay no coupons. Furthermore, taking on 
additional debt at an interest rate of 5.5% in order 
to purchase a zero-coupon bond with an internal 
rate of return of 3.8% would leave Greece worse 
off. Compared to the baseline scenario of rolling 
all maturing government bonds into new 
multilateral loans with an interest rate of 5.5%, 
implementation of the French proposal would 
increase the net present value of Greece’s public 
debt.  
Conclusion 
14. We have shown that implementation of the 
French initiative under the proposed parameters 
would significantly worsen the solvency of the 
Hellenic Republic. It would result in a marked 
increase in gross government debt and in net debt 
service over the coming years. From Greece’s 
perspective, it is difficult not to regard the 
initiative in its current form as an insult.  
15. The French proposal mimics the form of the 
Brady plan, without accepting its economic 
substance, namely to provide debt relief to 
countries with a clear sovereign debt overhang. In 
the 17 sovereign debt restructuring exercises 
undertaken under the terms of the Brady plan 
between 1990 and 1997, private sector holders of 
government bonds accepted to exchange their 
original claims into new instruments with the 
same notional but a lower coupon rate (Par 
bonds) or into new instruments with a lower 
notional but the same coupon rate (Discount 
bonds). Under the French proposal for Greece, on 
the other hand, commercial banks are offering a 
partial exchange of their original claims into new 
bonds with the same notional and a higher 
coupon rate. On top of this, commercial banks are 
demanding a cash repayment of 30% of their 
original claim, a principal guarantee on the new 
bonds, and a GDP-linked surcharge on future 
coupon payments. Banks would be well-advised 
to remember that the recovery value on claims 
against Russia and Argentina were 46% and 25% 
of original face value, respectively.3 These two 
countries defaulted on their obligations when 
interest payments on government debt 
approached 4% of GDP. In the case of Greece, 
interest payments on government debt are 
expected to reach 8.6% of GDP under the most 
optimistic assumptions, which arguable presents 
a greater challenge to sovereign creditworthiness. 
Asking too much from a distressed sovereign 
may well result in getting too little. 
16. In spite of its shortcomings, the French 
proposal is a good starting point in the design of 
a solution for Greece, as it acknowledges the need 
                                                     
3 Federico Sturzenegger and Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 
“Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt 
Restructurings, 1998–2005”, IMF Working Paper 05/137, 
July 2005 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/ 
2005/wp05137.pdf) 
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for private sector involvement in dealing with the 
country’s sovereign debt overhang. In order to be 
successful, the parameters of a sovereign debt 
restructuring debt must alleviate Greece’s public 
debt service costs, and bring interest expenditures 
on public debt relative to GDP into the range of 
what advanced economies have been paying over 
past decades. Reducing the cash component of 
the planned bond exchange and lowering the 
coupon rate of the new long-term Greek 
government bonds with principal guarantee to a 
level of 1%, plus a GDP-linked surcharge would 
turn this into a sensible proposal. Private 
creditors should also be offered an option to 
exchange their holdings into new long-term 
Greek government at a somewhat higher coupon 
rate if they are willing to forego the accounting 
advantages of the proposed principal guarantee.  
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Annex 
June 24, 2011 
Fédération Bancaire Française 
 
To: Ministère de l’Economie, des Finances et de l’Industrie 
Subject: Long-term investor initiative for Greece 
 
1) Context 
French regulated investors have committed since April 2010 to maintain their holdings in existing Greek 
government bonds (the “Existing GGBs”)4. This constant support has prevented a possible systemic shock 
on the Greek debt market and by extension of the European government bond market. 
Further to our earlier discussions, we understand that it is now critical (i) to structure a voluntary 
mechanism allowing Greece to reach €30bn of government financing from private investors by July 1, 
2014, and (ii) to prevent credit event on Greece CDS. 
 
2) Proposal 
During the review of holders of Existing GGBs, it has become apparent that a large portion of holders are 
regulated investors. These investors often have different needs based on accounting, regulatory, tax and 
investment considerations. Flexibility in any proposed initiative is essential to maximize investor 
participation. For this reason, it is preferable to offer multiple options to bondholders who have varying 
needs and constraints. 
Assumptions: 
Having no specific information on the holders of the Existing GGBs (private vs. public, institutional vs. 
retail, amounts per individual bond per holder, etc.), we have assumed the following: 
 The total Existing GGBs maturing by mid 2014 amounts to €85.5bn; 
 The European Central Bank and Euro Area Central Banks hold €25bn out of the €85.5bn;  
 A significant percentage – up to 80% – of the holders (the “Participants”) of the remaining €60.5bn 
would be willing to contribute to the proposed mechanism (i.e. up to €50bn); and 
 From July 2011 to July 2014, an estimated €30bn of net financing would be provided to Greece by 
the Participants. 
Objectives:  
One of the primary success factors underpinning the European Union and the International Monetary 
Fund program (the “Program”) revolves around the ability of Greece to access international capital 
markets for debt financing. The medium-term sustainability of the Greek government debt profile and 
risk of future debt restructuring is of paramount concern for many investors. Further clarity, additional 
transparency and sharing of information between the European Union, the International Monetary Fund 
and investors is essential to restoring investor confidence in Greece.  
The long-term investor initiative for Greece (the “Proposal”) aspires, through the provision of long-term 
financing, to reduce short-term stresses on the Greek debt profile and to allow Greece to focus on longer-
term investments needed to generate economic growth and foster a durable recovery. The performance-
                                                     
4 This amount and the proposed mechanism exclude any Greek sovereign bonds held on trading books. 
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based remuneration linked to Greek GDP growth further supports the spirit of cooperation between 
private sector investors and Greece to make economic recovery objectives a reality as soon as possible.  
Description of the Proposal 
The European Union and the International Monetary Fund would continue to provide new debt financing 
to Greece, in coordination with the commitment provided by the Participants, to support the medium-
term sustainability of the Greek fiscal situation. 
During the period from July 2011 until June 2014 (the “Period”), following each redemption of Existing 
GGBs, each Participant undertakes to participate in one of the following options. 
Option 1: 30-year financing to Greece principal-guaranteed by SPV 
Participants will invest a minimum of 70% of the principal amount of proceeds received (the “Received 
Amounts”) in new Greek government bonds, resulting in a net debt financing of at least 50% of the 
Received Amounts for Greece, as described below (the “New GGBpg”): 
 Government bonds issued by the Hellenic Republic with a maturity at issue of 30 years; 
 With a full principal guarantee by an SPV collateralised by zero-coupon bonds purchased from one or 
more AAA-rated sovereigns, supranational institutions or European agencies (the “Collateral”);  
 Bearing interest at a rate of 5.5%5 plus the yearly Greek GDP growth capped at 2.5% and floored at 0% 
per annum6; and 
 Listed on an EU regulated market, but with restricted trading in the New GGBpg until 1st January 
20227. 
Description of the Collateral SPV Structure 
 
                                                     
5 Similar to the current interest rate paid by Greece for its borrowings under the European Union financing package 
6 To compensate for the significantly longer maturity lending compared to the 7.5-year financing provided by the 
European Union financing package 
7 Trading and transferability restrictions do not apply to ECB financing transactions 
Investors Hellenic Republic
New Investment 
Amount7
New GGBpg
Loan1 for [30]% of 
New Investment 
Amount
Collateral 
SPV
1 30-year zero-coupon loan
2 Guarantee Agreement to provide principal repayment of New GGBpg in case of default of 
principal repayment on the New GGBpg by the Hellenic Republic
3 In case of non-payment by the Hellenic Republic of the principal repayment on the New 
GGBpg, Collateral SPV will make immediate payment to the paying agent of cash funds 
received from the principal redemption of the Collateral
4 AAA rated supranational institution and/or European agency
5 The cash price of the 30-year zero-coupon bonds is expected to be around 30% of par
6 The Collateral is placed with the ECB as trustee for safe-keeping
7 The New Investment Amount is equal to a minimum of 70% of the Received Amount
Guarantee 
Agreement2
Principal Guarantee provided on New GGBpg3
Collateral 
Issuer4
[30]% of the New 
Investment Amount
30-year zero-coupon 
bonds (the “Collateral”)5
ECB6
The Collateral
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The above structure is the favored option by investors due to accounting, regulatory and investment-
eligibility constraints. Additional structures are being studied, such as structured credit options8, but raise 
specific issues for the majority of regulated investors. 
Option 2: 5-year Greek government bonds 
Participants will invest a minimum of 90% (and preferably 100%) of the Received Amounts in new GGBs 
as described below (the “New GGB”): 
 Government bonds issued by the Hellenic Republic with a maturity at issue of 5 years; 
 Bearing interest at a rate of 5.5%9; and 
 Listed on an EU-regulated market, but with restricted trading10. 
Benefits of the Proposal 
 Collective and voluntary effort from bondholders to provide 30-year credit enhanced financing or 5-
year vanilla financing for Greece at fair conditions, to complement existing support from the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund, without support from European taxpayers; 
and 
 The private-sector commitment should provide Greece with the necessary financial support to focus 
on the objectives provided for under the Program. 
Conditions precedent and ongoing conditionality 
 Informal clearance from rating agencies that the Proposal will not trigger a downgrade to default or 
similar status on the Hellenic Republic, Existing GGB, New GGB or New GGBpg; 
 ECB’s willingness not to sell its Existing GGBs during the Period; 
 A significant majority of bondholders participate as Participants; 
 Greece respects its commitments under the Program; and 
 The European Union and the International Monetary Fund respect their current commitments, 
disburse funding as provided under the Program and continue to provide assistance to promote the 
medium-term sustainability of the Greek fiscal situation. 
                                                     
8 In the event of an eventual structured credit option, prior confirmation that i) securities issued will be eligible for 
Eurosystem refinancing purposes and ii) will qualify as “HQLA” will be needed by regulated investors. 
9 Similar to current interest rate paid by Greece for its borrowings under the European Union financing package. 
10 Trading and transferability restrictions do not apply to ECB financing transactions. 
